That was the atmosphere of crouching nervousness. even before the Germans had launched more than a few of their latest specimens of submarine cruisers.

No attempt was ever made by our powerful Navy to turn its great guns on the submarine nests of Flanders. When I ventured to suggest *Rate of sinkings;* such an idea it was turned down *Outlook in* peremptorily.

1917 In the absence of an effective plan for grappling with this threat to our existence as a sea power, there was every reason for Admiral Jellicoe's gloom. And he certainly had no fresh suggestions for coping with the emergency. Here are official figures supplied to me from the Shipping Department of the Admiralty in July, 1917, showing the prospect in front of us if the convoy system failed and if the destruction of our shipping continued at the same rate as it had proceeded during the first two quarters of the year :—

	Estimated Loss per annum.	
	(i) On basis of losses during first half of 1917 X2,	**(a)** On basis of losses during second quarter of 1917. X4.
VESSELS SUNK, *Tons*	***Gross Tons.***	***Gross***
British	4,191,000	5,141,000
Foreign	2,857,000	3,078,000
Total.....	7,048,000	8,219,000
VESSELS DAMAGED BY TORPEDO OR MINE		
British	915,000	1,055,000
Foreign*	624,000	631,000
Total.....	1,539,000	1,686,000
GRAND TOTAL ..	.. 8,587,000	9,905,000

* Foreign vessels damaged are assumed to bear same ratio to Foreign

vessels sunk as in case of British vessels, actual figures not being available.